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The Return to Returnables: New York
Enacts a Bottle Bill
I. Introduction
In September, 1983, New York became the ninth state to
implement bottle bill legislation.' New York's new law encour-
ages consumers to return beer and soft drink containers by re-
quiring a mandatory five cent deposit.' Since 1971, when Oregon
enacted the first bottle bill,$ many states have weighed the con-
flicting evidence presented by environmentalists4 and the bottle
industry5 in deciding whether to join this "return to return-
ables." The container and beverage industries remain the most
formidable opponents to further bottle bill legislation,6 although
support for national legislation is emerging despite industry ef-
forts.7 To date, almost twenty percent of the states have enacted
bottle bills, despite intense industry lobbying. Thus far, the bills
have withstood constitutional challenges brought by industry
opponents.8
Part II of this Comment will discuss the growth of the dis-
posable container industry after World War II, and the provi-
sions of state bottle bills enacted in response to this expansion.
Part III presents industry arguments against bottle bills and the
effect industry efforts have had on state legislation. Part IV re-
1. The New York State Returnable Container Act, N.Y. ENVn. CONSERV. LAW §§
27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney Supp. 1982), provides that a retailer must accept returned
beverage containers for carbonated soft drinks, mineral and soda water, beer, and other
malt beverages, and must pay the consumer the statutory refund value of each container.
2. Id. at § 27-1005.
3. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.810-.995 (Supp. 1981) (originally passed in 1971, effective
Oct. 1, 1972).
4. See, e.g., E. LOWRY, T. FENNER & R. LOWRY, DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES: A
GUIDE TO MINIMUM DEPOSIT LEGISLATION (Jan. 1975) (published by the Stanford Envi-
ronmental Law Society) [hereinafter cited as DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES]; see also
infra notes 13-17, 77-87 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 49-74 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 20 for a discussion of the constitutional challenges.
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views New York's experience in passing its bottle bill. Part V
explains the mechanics of the recycling system embodied in a
bottle bill. Finally, Part VI discusses the future for bottle bill
legislation.
II. Non-returnables: Problems and State Solutions
A. Market Expansion in the Container Industry
The dramatic increase in the number of throwaway contain-
ers in the early 1950's was a result of the metal and container
industries' thirst for new markets after World War II. Before the
War, and through the 1950's, most bottles and cans were return-
able." After the War, the steel and aluminum industries per-
ceived the throwaway container as a tremendous new growth
area to replace military production for their underutilized opera-
tions. At that time, returnable glass bottles were typically used
ten to fifteen times before being discarded.10 By replacing them
with non-returnables, the container market could be increased
900% to 1400% over the then existing market. To achieve this
growth, the container industry marketed "convenience" instead
of conservation to the American consumer.
In addition to the appeal of disposables, other factors com-
bined to create the current container crisis. Advertisements
which extolled the virtues of "throwaway" convenience became a
license to litter.1 Moreover, as a result of post-war affluence,
Americans consumed more beverages. Between 1957 and 1972,
beverage consumption rose 33% while the use of throwaways in-
creased 221% .12 The public, however, did not foresee the magni-
tude of the hidden or external costs associated with throwaway
containers.
9. "In 1958, only two percent of soft drink and 42 percent of beer containers were
non-returnable. By 1972, 59% of soft drink and 77% of beer containers were non-return-
able." Gudger & Walters, Beverage Container Regulation: Economic Implications and
Suggestions for Model Legislation, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 265 (1976).
10. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 1.
11. See Hatfield & Owens, Minimum Deposits for Beverage Containers: National
Impacts and Current Federal Legislation, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
12. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 1 (citing Nonreturnable
Beverage Container Prohibition Act: Hearings on S. 2062 Before the Subcomm. on the
Env't of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 135-47 (1974) (statement
of John R. Quarles, Jr., Deputy Adm'r EPA)).
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Environmentalists lobbying for state legislation in the early
1970's stressed the external costs associated with throwaways
which aggregate to millions of dollars annually.13 These costs in-
clude expenditures to pick up roadside litter, loss of dwindling
landfill space, and depletion of mineral resources - both raw
materials and energy needed for container production. It is esti-
mated that 100 billion non-returnable containers are manufac-
tured annually and that 25% of them end up as litter.14 Each
year $500 million is spent by federal, state, and local govern-
ments to pick up roadside litter,1 5 a large portion of which is
beverage containers."' Disposable cans and bottles are a burden
on landfill areas, because they comprise 60 to 80% of all solid
waste by volume and 20 to 40% by piece.1 7 The high costs of
roadside cleanup and new landfill areas are paid directly by the
taxpayer. Expenses that citizens may not be aware of, however,
are the perhaps, inestimable costs of depleting irreplaceable
mineral and energy resources, a less obvious, but nevertheless
serious problem associated with disposable containers.
To meet these problems, state or national legislation, not
fragmented cleanup campaigns, was needed. In 1971, a national
bill was first introduced in Congress 8 and a container statute
reached the Oregon legislature. 9 Although the federal legislation
was defeated, Oregon passed the nation's first state bottle bill, a
bill that withstood industry challenges brought on constitutional
13. See Hatfield & Owens, supra note 11, at 4.
14. Id. at 2-3. The figure of 100 billion containers is based on industry estimates in
1974 of the projected volume by 1980. The 25% throwaway figure is based on estimates
in 1979 that one out of four of the 60 billion containers then manufactured annually were
littered.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. Litter volume dropped 21% in Oregon and 35% in Vermont after container
laws were implemented. Total litter could be reduced 40% by enactment of a national
bottle bill. Id.
17. Id.
18. According to Sandy Nelson at Environmental Action, federal container legisla-
tion has been introduced in every congressional session since 1971. Telephone interview
with Sandy Nelson, National Deposit Coordinator, Environmental Action, Washington,
D.C. (Aug. 8, 1983).
19. See DISPOSING OF NON-RErURNABLES, supra note 4, at 17-18.
The Oregon House Bill 1036 passed in 1971 after the legislature had failed to pass a
similar measure in 1969. The bill was signed into law by the Governor following heated
debate and became effective October 1, 1972. OR. Rlv. STAT. §§ 459.810-.995 (Supp.
1981).
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grounds.2" Vermont followed Oregon's lead one year later.21 By
20. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.810-.995 (Supp. 1981) (passed in 1971).
In 1973, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Oregon's bottle
bill. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691
(1973).
The bottle bill, in effect since 1972, was attacked by the industry plaintiffs as violat-
ing the commerce clause of the United States Constitution and the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. All three challenges were denied.
Plaintiffs' commerce clause argument, the strongest of the three, contended that the
bottle bill was an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce because of its ad-
verse impact on the distribution chain. The industry argued that disposable containers
were crucial to regional and national markets, that a mandatory deposit would result in
decreased consumption, and that recycling would excessively burden out-of-state bottlers
who had to travel greater distances to collect bottles than in-state distributors. See
generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 347 (1975).
Industry plaintiffs urged the court of appeals to use the traditional commerce clause
"balancing test" to determine if the burdensome impact on interstate commerce was jus-
tified by the putative benefit to the state. The balancing test, enunciated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), states that "[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. Plaintiffs argued that
the adverse impact on interstate commerce outweighed the state's interest and that state
police power must yield to federal authority. Secondly, the industry argued that alterna-
tive, less burdensome means of litter control could achieve the state's cleanup goals.
The Oregon court declined to use the balancing test, finding it inappropriate in cases
involving the public welfare. The court noted that since the process of weighing social
and economic values had been constitutionally assigned to the legislature, a valid exer-
cise of its police power would not be overturned because of an adverse impact on certain
economic interests. The court explained:
The blight of the landscape, the appropriation of lands for solid waste disposal,
and the injury to children's feet caused by pull-tops discarded in the sands of our
ocean shores are concerns not divisible by the same units of measurement as is the
economic loss to elements of the beverage industry and we are unable to weigh
them one against the other.
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. at -, 517 P.2d at
697.
The court also dismissed the equal protection argument by reasoning that even
though other types of containers might also create litter and solid waste, it was within
the legislature's discretion to regulate, as a first step in an otherwise valid program, those
containers produced by the beer and soft drink industry. Id. at -, 517 P.2d at 704. The
court declined to consider seriously the substantive due process argument that plaintiffs
had been denied a property right by the regulation. Id. at -, 517 P.2d at 703-04. The
Oregon Supreme Court denied review of the decision. Oregon Medical Ass'n v. Rawls,
281 Or. 293, 298, 574 P.2d 1103, 1105-06 (1978). Plaintiffs did not seek review before the
United States Supreme Court. After the 1973 Oregon decision, the industry focused its
bottle bill attacks through public referenda rather than through the judiciary. See infra
note 70 and accompanying text.
The next important judicial decision on container regulation was not until 1981
when the United States Supreme Court held that a Minnesota statute banning the sale
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/7
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the end of 1982, nine states,2 including New York, had enacted
legislation that provides strong consumer and industry incen-
tives to return and recycle containers.
B. Regulatory Features of Bottle Bills
A common feature of all container recycling statutes is the
requirement that a retailer or authorized redemption center
must pay the customer a minimum refund for every returned
container. Several statutes describe the mandatory refund as a
"minimum" fee.23 Most states have set their minimum refund to
the consumer at five cents for a brand name container, although
of milk in non-refillable plastic containers did not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
Industry plaintiffs argued that the statute was discriminatory because it permitted milk
to be sold in non-recyclable cartons made of materials, other than plastic, such as card-
board. The Supreme Court dismissed the equal protection claim by deferring to the Min-
nesota legislature which "could rationally have decided that its ban on plastic non-re-
turnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives."
Id. at 466. The stated objectives of the Minnesota statute were to promote resource con-
servation, to ease solid waste disposal problems, and to conserve energy. Id. at 461-62.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the Minnesota statute did not violate
the commerce clause because it did not discriminate between interstate and intrastate
retailers, but regulated both evenhandedly, and the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce was relatively minor. The decision reversed an unreported ruling in favor of the
industry by the Minnesota District Court that was affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), rev'd, 449
U.S. 456 (1981), which had found that the discrimination effected by the statute was not
reasonably related to its purpose.
After these two decisions, it seems clear that in the area of state environmental reg-
ulation of litter and solid waste, courts are willing to grant considerable deference to
legislative wisdom. Secondly, both cases may be cited for the proposition that the equal
protection clause is not violated when certain industries or certain types of containers
are singled out for regulation if that regulation is rationally related to environmental
management. See generally Note, Container Legislation. Equal Protection . Commerce
Clause, 15 AKRON L. REV. 390 (1981).
21. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1521-1527 (Supp. 1983).
22. The nine states, listed in order of passage, with mandatory container legislation
are: Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.810-.995 (Supp.1981); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 1521-1527 (Supp. 1983); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.571-.576 (West
Supp. 1983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 1861-1871 (Supp. 1982); Connecti-
cut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-243 to -251 (West Supp. 1983); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 455 C.1-.14 (West Supp. 1983); Delaware, DE. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6051-6060 (Supp.
1982); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, §§ 321-327 (West Supp. 1983); New
York, N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
23. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §459.820 (Supp. 1981) (every container shall have a
refund value of not less than five cents).
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one state has already increased that amount to ten cents.24 Usu-
ally the retailer must accept any empty container of a beverage
brand and bottle size which he sells if the container is not defec-
tive and does not contain foreign materials. The retailer usually
receives a handling fee from the manufacturer to cover the cost
of accepting, sorting, and storing the returnables2
In addition to requiring minimum refunds for bottles, most
statutes ban pull-tops on metal cans, as they are a source of in-
jury to people and animals.26 A majority of states also ban non-
biodegradable plastic connecting loops used to hold six pack
units together because they are slow to decompose and they are
unsafe for animals.27
Most bottle bills regulate containers for malt beverages
(beer and ale) and soft drinks, but not those for wine, "hard"
liquor, milk, or fruit juice.28 No statutes currently regulate non-
beverage containers for such items as condiments or baby foods.
The usual explanation offered for not regulating these containers
is that they are simply not a major source of roadside litter.29
24. Michigan amended its statute in 1978 to raise the minimum refund to ten cents
for a standard size container, the highest in the nation. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
445.572 (West Supp. 1983). Other states including New York may redeem liter-sized con-
tainers for ten cents. Telephone interview with Judith Enck, Executive Director, Envi-
ronmental Planning Lobby, Albany, N.Y. (Aug. 1, 1983). See Appendix for a comparison
of state refund values.
25. Minimum handling fees are set by statute in seven states and vary from one to
two cents per container. The amount is sometimes expressed as a percentage of the de-
posit so that as the refund goes up, the handling fee automatically increases. See Appen-
dix for a comparison of handling fees.
26. Of nine states enacting minimum deposit laws, only Michigan and Massachu-
setts do not prohibit pull-top cans.
27. The six states which prohibit retaining loops are: Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
459.850(5) (Supp. 1981); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1525(a)(2) (Supp. 1983);
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1868.2 (Supp. 1982); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7 § 6059.(2) (Supp. 1982); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 324 (West
Supp. 1983); and New York, N.Y. EvTrL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1011(4) (McKinney Supp.
1982). Massachusetts is the only state to prohibit loops, but not pull-tops. Farmers com-
plain that cows and other domestic animals eat the plastic loops littered along the road-
side and environmentalists cite harm to fowl and small mammals which get caught in the
loops. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 8.
28. Iowa's Beverage Containers Deposit Law does require a minimum deposit on
"alcoholic liquor" containers. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455 C.1 (West Supp. 1983). The law
further provides that $100,000 annually be transferred to the Iowa Department of Sub-
stance Abuse "for the care, maintenance, and treatment of alcoholics." Id. at § 455 C.11.
29. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 47.
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There are two types of bottles in the container industry,
brand name and certified, an industry name for a standardized
bottle. Two state statutes make separate provision for each."
Brand name bottles are used almost exclusively in the soft drink
industry where consumer identification is linked to the size,
shape, color, and name embossed on the glass bottle."' For in-
stance, most people know that a "Coke" bottle looks different
than a "Pepsi" bottle. In the beer industry, some containers
carry brand names, but many are certified bottles which, be-
cause of their standard size, shape, and color, may be reused by
any manufacturer.3 2 Refunds for certified containers are some-
times less than for brand names because they are more fungible
in the recycling system.
Although the consumer receives a smaller refund for certi-
fied containers, they are redeemed at the highest rate of all
returnables. s Their return rate indicates that convenience, more
than cash, is the key to a successful recycling program. With cer-
tified bottles, consumers do not have to find a store which sells a
particular brand or size to be certain of receiving a refund.
Manufacturers save money because they can retrieve a certified
bottle more cheaply than producing a new one.3 4 Retailers do
not experience the same sorting and handling problems as they
do with brand name bottles.
Most state statutes require the retailer to accept all contain-
ers of products he sells, provided that they are empty, clean, and
undamaged.3 5 This provision is in response to an industry objec-
tion that storing sticky bottles is unsanitary and attracts in-
sects." Broken bottles may also be refused.3 7 This provision
30. Oregon refunds a minimum of two cents for a certified container, OR. Rv. STAT.
§459.820(2) (Supp. 1981), and five cents for a brand name container. Id. at § 459.820(1).
Michigan refunds certified containers for a minimum of five cents each and brand name
containers for ten cents each. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 445.571(d) (West Supp. 1983).
Other states with certified containers redeem them at the standard refund value.
31. See Gudger & Walters, supra note 9, at 284.
32. Id.
33. In Oregon, 95% of all packaged beer was sold in certified containers within four
years after passage of the state's bottle bill. Consumer return rates were 94% for certi-
fied containers, 91% for non-certified soft drink containers, and only 70% for cans. Id. at
271 n.26.
34. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 50-51.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1009(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
36. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 119-20.
19831
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reduces the retailer's costs and the likelihood that workers will
be injured handling the bottles.
All state bills provide an option for retailers and distribu-
tors to establish redemption centers in locations separate from
retail outlets.38 This provision is a further effort to alleviate re-
tail concerns about limited or unsanitary storage space. Retail-
ers, however, often find that savings in storage and handling
costs are outweighed by other factors."9 Retailers who use re-
demption centers may lose customers to more convenient stores
that accept containers; a customer generally spends his refund in
the store where he receives it. Since redemption centers do not
generate profit, retailers and distributors must finance them, re-
sulting in additional, and probably unnecessary, costs. Further,
the consumer is inconvenienced, and recycling is less effective, if
the consumer must make an extra trip to the redemption center
instead of returning empties on the next trip to the store.4
The state administrative agency which oversees enforce-
ment of bottle bill legislation varies from state to state. In most
instances, it is the state's environmental agency, but some have
designated the liquor control commission or even the depart-
ment of agriculture to enforce their bottle law.' 1 Commentators
urge that the "best" agency is one which presently administers
similar regulations for alcoholic beverages, health standards, or
environmental efforts. 2 All states except Iowa have civil penalty
37. Id.
38. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1013 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
39. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4 at 85.
40. Redemption centers are not mandatory in any state. Most states allow for any
person to establish a center with approval of the law's governing agency. Since such cen-
ters are non-profit and they are not likely to be established without industry financing,
the decision will therefore rest with the retailers and distributors. See DISPOSING OF NON-
RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 52. An environmental lobbyist points out that redemption
centers could accept a variety of recycled items such as newspapers and jars so that a
trip to return beverage containers need not be for a single purpose. Telephone interview,
supra note 24.
41. In Oregon and Michigan, the Liquor Control Commission is the regulating
agency. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.810(3) (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §455.571(k)
(West Supp. 1983). In Maine, it is the Department of Agriculture. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 1862(6) (Supp. 1982). In New York, the Department of Environmental Conser-
vation enforces the law. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1003(5) (McKinney Supp.
1982). See Appendix for a comparison of state agencies.
42. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 47.
[Vol. 4:141
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/7
RETURNABLES
provisions with fines ranging from $100 to $1000 - often for
every day the violation persists. Some states have criminal pen-
alties.43 Penalties are invoked to dissuade distributors and re-
tailers from refusing empty containers.
All state statutes become effective one to two years after the
statute is passed. The interim period between the time the bill
passes and the time the bill becomes effective is designed to al-
low the industry to plan the recyling system, to use existing in-
ventories of containers with pull-tops or plastic loops, and to al-
low states time to advise citizens of the new law.
Features that are not common to all bottle bills are provi-
sions for continued public education programs and studies to
monitor the effects of the bill. Two statutes specifically provide
for on-going educational programs designed for travelers and
school children. Only Oregon and New York 15 require studies
to measure the early economic and environmental effects occa-
sioned by the new legislation. Nevertheless, although other stat-
utes do not require such studies, most states have conducted
these impact studies;4" the results have been used to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of bottle bills.
Through subtle variation in bottle bill features, states have
had an opportunity to resume their role as "laboratories for the
nation's concerns. '47  States have taken the initiative in
container regulation, and will continue to do so in the absence of
43. See Appendix for a comparison of the penalty provisions.
44. Vermont and Delaware provide for information programs which require that
travel pamphlets, road maps, and similar publications have a standard announcement
informing travelers of the container law and urging compliance. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1526(a) (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6058(a) (Supp. 1982). In addition, both
states have instructed their departments of public instruction to distribute anti-litter
information in primary and secondary schools. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1526(b) (Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6058(b) (Supp. 1982).
45. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 7, 1983 N.Y. Laws
349 (amending ch. 200, sec. 10, 1982 N.Y. Laws 619). See infra notes 114-15 and accom-
panying text (discussion of the New York study). A report is due by December 31, 1984,
approximately sixteen months after the law goes into effect in September, 1983. For in-
formation regarding the Oregon study, see DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note
4, at 23.
46. See, e.g., DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 31-32, for a discus-
sion of studies conducted in Vermont.
47. State Recycling Program Announced: Plan to Pay Steel, Aluminum Cans,
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 825 (Oct. 17, 1980) (citing remarks of the Governor of
Arkansas, Bill Clinton).
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a national bill. Since the federal government has usually taken
the lead in environmental regulation, the innovative role states
have assumed in this sphere is somewhat novel.
III. Industry Opposition to Container Laws
Since the first bottle bill was passed in 1971, eight other
states have enacted similar legislation, and nine states have de-
feated such measures.48 The defeats demonstrate that bottle
bills are controversial and that industry trade associations are
formidable opponents for citizens' groups and coalitions that
lobby in favor of container laws.49 For every environmentalist
who argues that recycling reduces litter, solid waste, and the de-
pletion of mineral resources, there is a bottling industry oppo-
nent who disputes the validity of these arguments and contends
that bottle bills increase beverage costs, cause unemployment,
and create problems with container handling logistics.5 0 Philo-
sophically, the container and beverage industry maintains that it
is being singled out by legislators and the public to assume more
than a fair share of environmental clean up costs. This discrimi-
nation is attributed to the high visibility of littered containers
and, in the case of beer, a long history of regulation. Practically,
the industry advances several arguments, one of which is that it
is unreasonable to assume that the container industry can return
to a recycling system that functioned through the 1950's, since
the market has changed dramatically in the past thirty years.51
48. See supra note 22 (list of the nine states which have passed container laws since
1971). The nine states which have defeated bottle bills by public referenda since 1970 are
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Washington, and Mas-
sachusetts (which defeated legislation in 1976 but passed it in 1982). Voters in three
states have upheld container legislation since 1976: Michigan, Massachusetts, and Maine.
See generally Why the New York State Beverage Container Mandatory Deposit Law
Should Be Repealed, Robert C. Donovan, Regional Public Affairs Director, Owens-Illi-
nois, Inc., Brockport, New York at 2 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Owens-Illinois
Report].
Efforts to repeal legislation were defeated in Maine in 1979 and Massachusetts in
1982. No state that has enacted a bottle bill has repealed it after its effective date. Id.
49. As the Governor of Vermont noted during his state's bottle bill battle, "[T]he
National Brewers' Association and other big guns in the industry are sending in the
troops to beat little Vermont into the bullrushes." See DIsPOsING OF NON-RETURNABLES,
supra note 4, at 55 (citing the Rutland Daily Herald, Oct. 4, 1973).
50. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 2.
51. Id. at 3-6.
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These arguments have formed the basis for repeated industry
victories.
The industry has defeated bottle bills in nine states since
1970 by direct vote.2 In their pre-election campaigns, industry
lobbyists have disputed purported reductions in litter, solid
waste, and energy resources. Instead, they argue for alternative
ways to reduce litter. The gist of the industry argument is that
even if disposable containers create problems, mandatory de-
posit laws are neither an equitable nor an efficient system to al-
leviate these ills. First, the industry asserts that litter continues
to be a problem even after bottle bills are implemented and that
the cost of such legislation outweighs the benefits. In an indus-
try prepared report written to effect repeal of New York's bottle
bill, the industry concluded that "a mandated deposit on soft
drink and beer containers in no way guarantees clean road-
sides," and that the legislation is a "merely symbolic attack on
litter."53 In Michigan, a state-sponsored study two years after
the bottle bill became effective, indicated that total litter may
have increased by ten percent. Although Michigan's litter from
beverage containers was reduced, the industry notes that it was
only nine percent by volume and eighteen percent by weight,
suggesting that these figures are not significant reductions com-
pared to beverage cost increases of $200 million per year in that
state." In addition to challenging purported reductions in litter,
the industry argues that beverage containers are only about five
percent of the total solid waste volume and thus not worth the
added expense.5 5 With respect to the environmentalists' conten-
tion that bottle bills conserve resources and energy, industry op-
ponents counter that there will be increased water use for clean-
ing the bottles and increased gasoline consumption for
additional trips to return bottles."
Moreover, the industry argues that there is a hidden tax
factor in such measures: a state legislature would not pass a bill
calling for $100 million in new taxes to reduce litter, although it
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Sec'y of State, Cal. Ballot Pamphlet for the Gen. Election 45 (Nov. 2, 1982).
19831
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is willing to pass that increase on to consumers in higher bever-
age costs. 7 The industry opponents project that the increased
costs in New York will exceed one dollar per case or more than
$400 million annually.58 These costs come from the reverse dis-
tribution process by which containers are routed back to the dis-
tributor, and from unclaimed deposits which are "paid" by the
consumer if he does not return the container.
Furthermore, opponents contend that thousands of jobs are
lost in the container industry, in related companies which sup-
ply goods and services to manufacturers, and in the trucking in-
dustry.5 9 They project a minimum reduction in container usage
of thirty-three percent in New York as a result of the bottle
bill.60 They also point out that, based on sales in Maine, Michi-
gan, and Connecticut, there is at least a ten percent drop in bev-
erage sales due to higher prices and consumer inconvenience. 1
Finally, the industry argues that bottle bills are a major an-
noyance for consumers and that the litter problem is caused by
"a very few people with bad manners. '62 As an alternative, the
industry favors "a better approach: enforcement of existing laws,
education programs for young people and support for existing
voluntary recycling." 68
To publicize these arguments, opponents have expended
considerable sums in lobbying efforts to defeat bottle bills. Wil-
liam Coors, president of Adolf Coors Brewing Company, testified
57. See Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 5. What this argument does not
acknowledge is that New Yorkers are already spending millions of dollars annually in
litter and solid waste costs.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. Proponents argue that jobs are gained in other areas and that a net gain in
unemployment, particularly in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, results. The real dispute
seems to be that the lost jobs are "highly paid and skilled jobs ranging from $18,000-
$35,000 per year" according to the Glass Bottle Blowers Association of the AFL-CIO. Id.
at 7.
60. Id. The industry opponents argue that this decrease would result in 3200 - 4150
lost jobs in container and teamster industries. A New York study prepared by the State
Office of Development Planning predicted 5000 new jobs as a result of recycling and
refilling operations. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
61. Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 7. Proponents counter that although
initial drops do occur, sales rebuild and level off, usually within one year of implementa-
tion. See Gudger & Walters, supra note 9, at 287.
62. See Cal. Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 56, at 44.
63. Id. at 45. See infra note 97 for a discussion of the disadvantages of voluntary
recycling programs.
[Vol. 4:141
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/7
RETURNABLES
in the mid-1970's that the industry spent a "minimum of $20
million a year fighting container deposit legislation."" An envi-
ronmental lobbyist indicates that spending probably remains
near that figure, and that eleven million dollars was spent in five
states which had container laws on their ballots in 1982.65 Bottle
bill proponents contend that because of budget limitations, they
are ill-prepared to fight the expensive campaigns financed by the
container industry. 6
These massive expenditures and intensive lobbying efforts
have been successful, notwithstanding nine industry defeats. A
1975 monograph6 7 indicated that although only Oregon and Ver-
mont had passed bottle bills as of that date, every state in the
Union had considered one." In the 1982 elections there were
more bottle bills before voters than ever before."
The November, 1982 elections were indicative of the history
of industry successes. Bottle bills were defeated in 1982 by vot-
ers in four states: Arizona, Washington, Colorado, and Califor-
nia.70 In response to these defeats, industry lobbyists note that
the last time bottle bills passed by popular vote was in 1976,
when both Maine and Michigan approved voter referenda.7 1 De-
spite the defeats, an important victory was won in Massachu-
setts in 1982, where voters rejected a referendum to repeal their
64. See DISPOSING OF NON-RTURNABLzs, supra note 4, at 55.
65. Telephone interview, supra note 18.
66. Wells, California Fight on Banning Throwaways Could Affect Prospects for Na-
tional Law, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1982, at 37, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Wells].
67. See DISPOSING OF NON-RETURNABLES, supra note 4, at 55.
68. Id. at 65.
69. See Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 2. There were five voter referenda
in 1982: Arizona, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Washington; only Massachu-
setts upheld legislation. In 1976, there were four: Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Michigan. Maine and Michigan upheld legislation that year.
70. A California voter initiative, Proposition 11, organized after the state assembly
had failed to pass a bottle bill since the 1970's suffered an unexpected defeat (only 44%
voted to pass the bill). Only two weeks before the California election, polls indicated that
between 57 and 61% of the voters supported the initiative. Wells, supra note 66, at 37.
Proponents anticipated that the passage of a bottle bill in New York and California, the
two most populous states, would signal to Congress a voter mandate for a national
container deposit law. Instead, a pre-election, media blitz utilizing television commercials
and direct mail letters to two million voters resulted in a crucial defeat. See TV Blitz
Cans Bottle Bills, IN THESE Tnmss 7 (Nov. 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as IN THESE
TIS].
71. See Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 2.
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new bottle bill.7 2 In New York, the state legislature's bill was
signed into law in June, 1982 and, although amended in 1983, s
was not repealed or substantially altered.7 '
IV. The New York Experience
A. Legislative Background
A review of the legislative history of New York's bottle bill
provides a revealing glimpse of the political forces that deter-
mine the fate of controversial enactments. In New York, the
State Assembly Committee on Commerce, Industry and Eco-
nomic Development had considered a bottle bill every year since
the early 1970's, but heavy industry lobbying had kept the bill
off the floor for a vote. In recent years, support for the bill was
felt to be growing with predictions that the bill would pass the
Assembly, and perhaps the Senate, if it could get out of
committee."
On the other hand, then Governor Hugh Carey, whose term
ended in January, 1983, had indicated in 1981 his inclination to
veto the bill, citing the need for more data.7 ' The Governor's call
for additional information was met by the State Office of Devel-
opment Planning in a report initially issued in March, 1981 and
followed by a more extensive report in June, 1981.
The March report predicted that while consumer beverage
costs could rise by $200 million annually, the cost would be off-
set by income produced by the creation of 5000 new jobs. 7 Al-
though several hundred jobs could be lost in the glass container
industry as a result of reduced production, these losses would be
offset by jobs created in transportation, recycling, refilling, and
72. See IN THESE TIMES, supra note 70. In Massachusetts, voters upheld by a 59%
to 41% margin a container law previously passed by the state legislature, despite a two
million dollar battle waged by the beverage container industry to repeal the bottle bill.
73. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws
346 (amending N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney Supp. 1982)).
74. New York has no state provision for voter initiatives or referenda so that repeal
is possible only by the state legislature.
75. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1982, at B1, col. 2.
76. Albany Times Union, June 3, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
77. Id., Mar. 16, 1982, at 3, col. 3. The $200 million increase is based on estimates of
a twelve to fifteen cent increase per six pack of beer.
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warehousing operations.7 8 The report also indicated that litter
would be substantially reduced, energy would be saved, and lo-
calities would reduce solid waste disposal costs.7
9
The report concluded that although mandatory deposit leg-
islation might initially increase costs slightly, if the price of
materials, production, and energy continued to increase, such
deposits "may prove to be the wisest course" from an economic
point of view.80 The second report, released June 1, 1981, gener-
ally favored the bottle bill, but urged that the bill be delayed
until unresolved economic questions were answered.8' Conse-
quently, the Assembly Committee voted down the bill.
Despite this defeat, bottle bill supporters were optimistic
for two reasons. First, they saw the favorable report as the basis
of a shift in the Governor's anti-bottle bill position. Second, the
Assembly Speaker who had previously assigned the bill to the
Commerce Committee announced that for the 1982 legislative
session, the bottle bill would be assigned to the "more sympa-
thetic Environmental Conservation Committee."8 2
In March, 1982, a final staff report to Governor Carey from
the State Office of Economic Planning containing a detailed
analysis of cost projections by brewers, bottlers, and distributors
concluded that many of the arguments regarding costs were "un-
founded."s Aides to the Governor predicted that this report
would be the basis for the Governor's abandonment of his previ-
ous opposition to the measure." The report predicted that the
bill would raise the cost of a bottle of beer approximately two to
two and one-half cents, but that the industry's warnings of se-
vere adverse economic effects stemming from unemployment,
decreased profitability, and the industry's inability to absorb
capital costs were unsubstantiated.88 While industry sources had
warned of the loss of 7000 jobs, the state report found that only
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1981, at B2, col. 3. An environmental lobbyist suggests
that the primary reason for the defeat in 1981 was political pressure, not a lack of infor-
mation regarding costs. Telephone interview, supra note 24.
82. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1981, at B2, col. 3. The bill, in fact, was never reassigned.
83. Id. Mar. 15, 1982, at B1, col. 5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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600 would be lost in the "worst case," and that a net gain of
5000 jobs could result from recycling and refilling operations.
The report went on to point out that the five to seven percent
reduction in solid waste previously estimated by the Office of
Economic Development would result in a twenty-five million
dollar savings to localities, but it rejected proponents' optimistic
estimates that the price of beverages would actually decline.8 6
The Office of Economic Development also disputed the
costs estimated by the United States Brewers' Association which
included $609 million in capital outlays for new bottling equip-
ment, trucks, and storage space. It projected, instead, a capital
investment of $286 to $350 million. It noted that these costs
were manageable, since they would be offset by income from re-
cycling and unclaimed deposits which distributors would keep. 87
The report produced immediate reaction. The bill's sponsor
predicted that after the report, "the Governor would be hard-
pressed to justify a veto."88 A New York Times observer specu-
lated that since the Governor was not seeking re-election in 1982
and had already paid off his outstanding campaign debts, legis-
lators hoped he would be free from political pressures. This free-
dom allowed the Governor to abandon his previous support of
business interests and act on the merits of the bill.89
B. The Industry Alternative
The shift in favor of New York's bottle bill by the Governor
and the Speaker of the Assembly, both of whom had previously
been responsive to industry lobbying efforts, caught the
86. Id. The report made no recommendations, observing that costs and benefits
"cannot be equated in any quantifiable fashion." Id. Industry opponents criticized staff
members of the Office of Economic Development as being "pro-bottle bill." The author
of the report said that his personal support of the legislation had been "irrelevant" in
preparing the document. Id.
87. Id. at B6, col. 1. See discussion infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text on
sources of distributor income.
88. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1982, at B1, col. 5.
89. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1981, at B2, col. 3. In response to signals that the Assem-
bly was giving serious consideration to the bill, the president of a Westchester County
beverage distributor advised 150 other chief executive officers to contact the Governor
voicing their opposition. Reportedly, about 60 executives phoned the Governor's office.
Id.
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container industry by surprise.90 Alarmed by their narrow escape
at the end of the 1981 legislative session, industry lobbyists per-
suaded a New York State Senator to introduce a competing
anti-litter bill in the 1982 legislative session.9 A compromise
agreement announced by the Assembly Speaker allowed both
bills to be brought to the Assembly floor for a vote. This was the
first time that a New York bottle bill had made it out of com-
mittee in ten years of debate.9
The industry's proposed alternative would allocate one per-
cent of the state's corporate franchise tax to a state "Litter Con-
trol Program.' 3 The tax which represented a five cents per case
charge on beverage containers would expire after five years and
would be void if a state or federal beverage container deposit law
were passed." A feature of the industry program was that it
would reduce litter by paying teenagers and welfare recipients to
pick up trash along selected state highways and public lands
from June through August. The plan would also fund a litter
education program. That program would allocate $200 thousand
for a temporary commission to develop a state recycling plan
and would cost an estimated eleven million dollars annually."
The temporary commission would be replaced by a ten-member
Litter Control Recycling Council with a permanent staff.9" The
program did not ban pull-top metal openers or plastic loop re-
tainers. Unlike the bottle bill, it provided for minimal recycling,
since without a five cent deposit paid by the distributor, there
would be little economic incentive to sell the containers for
90. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1982, at B6, cols. 1-2.
91. Id. The competing bill was introduced by Senator William T. Smith of Big
Flats.
92. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1982, at B2, col. 3.
93. SHMA CLUB NzwsLrrRR, HUDSON MOHAWK GROUP, May-June 1982, at 1 [here-
inafter cited as SImRRA CLUB NEWSLzrrm].
94. Id.
95. Id. Opponentsargued that such efforts would duplicate work already done for
the Department of Environmental Conservation's Solid Waste Management Plan.
96. Id. at 2. In contrast to the Litter Control Program, the bottle bill would require
no new bureaucracy, except for a temporary study commission. Industry supporters cited
the effective use of litter control alternatives in Alaska, Arizona, California, Nebraska,
Ohio, Washington, and New Jersey. See Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 2. Op-
ponents indicated that similar programs had been repealed or reduced in Colorado, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, and Vermont. See SIERR CLUB NzWSLErrER, supra note 93, at 2.
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scrap. "'
C. How the New York Bill Passed
On May 25, 1982, the State Assembly voted on the bottle
bill and the industry's Litter Control Program. Despite the fact
that the two bills were inconsistent, legislators passed them
both.98 Although some assembly members were initially hesitant,
once a majority voted in favor of the bottle bill, reluctant legisla-
tors joined the majority. The Litter Control bill passed by a
smaller margin.9 9 Since the Assembly voted in favor of both
bills, commentators felt that the controversy had merely been
passed on to the Senate.100 When the Senate passed both bills,
however, Governor Carey had the final decision on which bill
would become law.
Although legislators had praised themselves for "great cour-
age"101 ' in passing two inconsistent bills, the Governor chided
them for their ambivalence.102 At the same time, Carey aides
noted that they had prepared both a veto and an approval mes-
sage for the bottle bill. Hours before the Governor signed the
bottle bill, aides did not know which bill would be
implemented.103
In retrospect, it is ironic that it was the industry's effort to
get its own bill on the Assembly floor for a vote that created the
opportunity for state legislators to vote for both bills and
thereby escape adverse political reaction. The industry that had
been so politically effective in the past was instrumental in its
97. Opponents of the litter control law thought that, whereas the bottle bill penal-
ized only those who did not return their containers, the litter control alternative required
all taxpayers to share the $11 million annual cost and reduced the recycling incentive.
An Albany newspaper editorial criticized the litter bill because it "subsidizes people's
sloppy habits." Albany Union Times, May 2, 1982, at C7, col. 1.
98. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1982, at B2, col. 1. Thirty legislators voted for both bills
and three voted against both. According to a lobbyist for the bottle bill, "We were teeter-
ing within one or two votes the whole time. Once we got 76 votes, people flew out of the
men's room." Id. at col. 3.
99. Id. The Litter Control Program passed by a vote of 85 to 61, fewer supporters
and more opponents than the bottle bill.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. See also N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, at B6, col. 3.
103. Id.
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own defeat and in enacting the New York bottle bill.
D. Provisions of the New York Bottle Bill
New York's Returnable Container Act,1 ' like most of its
predecessors, encourages recycling by requiring a minimum five
cent deposit on all beer and soft drink containers sold in the
state. 108 The Act also bans pull-top metal openers and plastic
connecting loops if they are not photodecomposable or bi-
odegradable.'" The law was postponed from its original effective
date of July 1 to September 12, 1983, to allow inventory reduc-
tions of non-returnable containers.'0 7
The New York legislation contains many of the provisions
discussed earlier which are common to most bottle bills.108 All
containers must be redeemed except those which are unclean,
damaged, or lack state identification.109 Like several other states,
New York's statute provides that the name or initials of the
state must appear on all containers. 10 The Act, as amended,
provides for a handling fee of one and one half cents to be paid
by the distributor to the retailer."' The law provides an option
to create redemption centers, though retailers and distributors
104. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney Supp. 1982). The
law states that it will provide a necessary incentive "for the economically efficient and
environmentally benign collection and recycling of... containers." Id. at § 27-1001.
105. Id. at § 27-1005. According to the Environmental Planning Lobby, liter-sized
bottles will probably be redeemed for ten cents each. Telephone interview, supra note
24. Only Michigan mandates a ten cent refund for regular size bottles. MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 445.571(d) (West Supp. 1983).
106. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 3, 1983 N.Y. Laws
347 (amending N.Y. ENvTL. CONsEsv. LAw § 27-1011(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982)). Prior
to its amendment, the law had banned all plastic loops without qualification.
107. Id. An environmentalist contends that the 10 week delay was a legislative con-
cession to postpone compliance during the summer when beverage sales are at a peak.
Telephone interview, supra note 24.
108. See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text for a description of common pro-
visions of bottle bills.
109. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-1009(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
110. Id. at § 27-1011(1). See Appendix for a comparison with other states.
111. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws
346 (amending N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. Lw § 27-1007(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982)). These
fees, originally set at 20% of the refund value or one cent, were raised by subsequent
amendment. At least one environmental lobbyist thinks this cost is part of a deliberate
industry effort to make the price increases artificially high in order to create consumer
resistance to the bottle bill. Telephone interview, supra note 24.
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may choose not to establish them for the reasons discussed ear-
lier.112 Unlike some other laws, however, the New York statute
does not have a provision for certified containers."13
New York's legislation calls for a temporary state commis-
sion to study the new law's statewide effect on environmental
and economic interests.11 The commission's report on whether
to continue or modify the statute is to be based, in part, on a
consideration of the bottle bill's effectiveness in achieving its en-
vironmental goals. Such results are to be balanced against the
economic impact on the beverage industry and the state in gen-
eral. The commission is to give special consideration to the law's
effect on small retailers, grocers, and tavern and restaurant
owners. 1
15
The New York bottle bill is administered by the state's De-
partment of Environmental Conservation (D.E.C.), which is em-
powered to prosecute violators for public nuisances and to levy
fines." ' In addition to fines, the D.E.C. is authorized to prose-
cute the fraudulent practice of double redemptions by distribu-
tors.1 The agency is also charged with promulgating regulations
112. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1015 (McKinney Supp. 1982). See supra notes
39-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of redemption centers.
113. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 459.820(2) (Supp. 1981). Environmental lobbyists in
New York were unable to override industry opposition to certified containers, a provision
which was not in the original bill passed in 1982. Telephone interview, supra note 24.
114. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws
346. That commission was to be formed by July 1, 1983. The July 1 deadline passed
without the commission being named, which concerned some environmental groups
which felt that the commission should be in operation prior to the effective date in order
to gather pre-and post-enactment statistics. Telephone interview, supra note 24.
115. N.Y. ENvrL. CoNsERv. LAW § 27-1001(4)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
116. N.Y. ENWL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-1015 (McKinney Supp. 1982). Penalties may
be enforced against "any person who shall violate any provision of this title." Id. Those
actually regulated are dealers (retailers), distributors, and redeemers at redemption cen-
ters. Fines are assessed for a retailer's refusal to accept an otherwise authorized
container or refusal to refund a deposit. This penalty is a $500 fine for each violation. Id.
117. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bottle Law), ch. 149, sec. 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws
346, states:
It shall be unlawful for a distributor, acting alone or aided by another, to return
empty beverage containers to a dealer or redemption center for their refund value
if the distributor had previously accepted such beverage containers from any
dealer or operator of a redemption center. A violation of this subdivision shall be a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less then five hundred nor more than one
thousand dollars and an amount equal to two times the amount of money received
as a result of such violation.
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for the act.'18
V. Mechanics of a Bottle Bill: Exchanging Containers and
Deposits
To understand the mechanics of the container distribution
system and the monetary exchanges that accompany each trans-
action, a four step analysis and explanation of the recycling sys-
tem follows." 9 Essentially, there are three actors in the system:
1) the retailer (i.e., the grocer), who is the middleman between
distributor and consumer, 2) the distributor, who is responsible
for supplying the retailer with full containers, and 3) the con-
sumer, who buys a beverage from the retailer and must return
the empty container to reclaim his deposit. For simplicity, as-
sume each of the four transactions involves 100 containers.
In step one, the retailer purchases 100 beverages from the
distributor. The retailer must pay, in addition to the wholesale
price of the beverage, a five cent deposit for each full container
he receives. Thus, the retailer pays five dollars and the distribu-
tor "makes" five dollars, 'which the distributor will not have to
repay until the 100 containers are returned. The retailer, there-
fore, has an out-of-pocket loss of five dollars in step one.
In step two, the retailer sells 100 beverages to a consumer.
The consumer pays, in addition to the retail price of the bever-
age, a five cent deposit per container. This transaction allows the
retailer to recoup his initial five dollar outlay, but only
momentarily.
In step three, the consumer returns the 100 empty contain-
ers and collects his five dollar deposit. This redemption creates a
second out-of-pocket expense for the retailer who must reim-
burse the consumer upon return of the containers. The retailer
also incurs handling costs of one and a half cents per container
for sorting and storing the empty containers.
Finally, in step four, the retailer redeems the 100 empty
Id.
118. Id. at 347.
119. The information which follows is taken from Notes on Applying Individual
State Figures and The Mechanics and Economics of a Deposit System for Beverage
Containers, handouts distributed by the Environmental Action Foundation's National
Clearinghouse for Beverage Container Deposit Legislation, Washington, D.C.
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containers, and the distributor pays him five dollars. In addition
to the five dollar deposit, the retailer is reimbursed one dollar
and fifty cents in handling fees. The reimbursement of these fees
permits the retailer to break even on the recycling process, by
allowing him to recoup the one and one half cent handling ex-
pense incurred in step three.
In contrast to the retailer, the distributor has a chance to
make money. In the example given, he has had investment use
of the retailer's five dollars for five to six weeks. In addition, he
owns 100 empty containers to be sold as scrap. On the average,
90 to 95 % of the original 100 containers will be returned. If 90
are redeemed, the distributor and the retailer will each keep
fifty cents in unclaimed deposits - the distributor will keep the
retailer's, the retailer will keep the consumer's. Unreturned con-
tainers are a continuing source of income for the distributor
who, in the example given, repays the retailer only four dollars
and fifty cents of his original five dollar deposit for 90 empty
containers. If the unclaimed deposits seem a "windfall" to the
distributor, they also represent the penalty that each consumer
must pay when he litters, rather than redeems his container.
Proponents of bottle bills have developed formulae indicat-
ing that distributors, at least, can make enough money from re-
cycling opportunities and unclaimed deposits to cover their han-
dling fees, and perhaps, other related costs.2 0 [While the bottle
bills of New York and other states do not require that contain-
ers be reused, there is often an increase in the use of refillable
glass bottles after container legislation is in place.]' Even when
bottles and cans are crushed, not reused, their sale as scrap
yields a sizeable income. The container mix nationwide is 45%
aluminum, 45% glass (20% of which is refillable, 25% of which
120. See The Mechanics and Economics of a Deposit System for Beverage Contain-
ers, supra note 119 (citing a United States General Accounting Office study which shows
that the income and costs for the first year should be equal).
Since some of the expenses are capital investment costs, after the first year the an-
nual income opportunities should exceed the operating costs of the system for both dis-
tributors and retailers. The same conclusion was reached by the accounting firm of Ar-
thur Young & Co. in a study done for the beverage industry. Id.
121. See Owens-Illinois Report, supra note 48, at 7 (where Owens-Illinois, Inc.
predicts "a minimum reduction in container usage of 33% in New York State as a result
of the bottle bill.").
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is single use), and 10% plastic.122 New Yorkers empty eight bil-
lion beverage containers annually. 23 Assuming a 90% return
rate, the value of scrap aluminum to the industry in New York
could be $27,405,000 annually and the value of scrap glass could
be $40 million annually.12 4 Many distributors do not now reclaim
scrap materials, because there is less incentive to reclaim in the
absence of a mandatory deposit law requiring a nickel for every
redeemed container, whether recycled, or not.'2 I
In addition to the income from selling scrap materials, there
is investment income to be made from the "float" in the early
weeks after the law becomes operative. The "float" represents
the deposits collected by the distributor from the retailer in the
first five to six weeks before the containers start to be redeemed.
Based on formulae developed by pro-bottle bill lobbyists, that
investment income in New York could be $4 million dollars."16
122. Notes on Applying State Figures, supra note 119.
123. Enck, Anti-Litter Activists Bottle Up Container Industry, 43 Bus. & Soc'y
Rov. 37, 41 (1982).
124. The Mechanics and Economics of a Deposit System for Beverage Containers,
supra note 119. The formula for determining scrap value, promulgated by Environmen-
tal Action, is as follows:
(1) ascertain the number of containers sold in the state;
(2) compute 90% or 95% of that number (depending on which return rate more
accurately reflects the state's success);
(3) of the containers available for sale, determine what number are aluminum by
multiplying by 45%;
(4) divide the total number of aluminum cans for sale by 24 (the number of cans
in a pound);
(5) divide the total number of pounds by 2,000 (the number of pounds in a ton);
and
(6) multiply the number of tons by the current dollar value of aluminum scrap;
the value as of Fall, 1982 was five dollars and eighty cents per ton.
Id.
To determine the figure for glass, compute a 90% return rate as above, and assum-
ing that 25% of the returned bottles are single use, multiply by 25%; divide by two (the
number of glass bottles per pound) and divide by 2000 to compute the number of tons
available for sale. Multiply by $80, the current value of glass scrap per ton.
125. The Mechanics and Economics of a Deposit System for Beverage Containers,
supra note 119.
126. See supra note 119. The figure is calculated as follows: multiply the state's
number of containers used annually by five cents to determine total annual deposits.
The "float" represents money that is available to the distributor for the first five to
six weeks after the bill's effective date; after the initial period, the money collected from
the retailer is offset by the money paid back to him for returned containers. Five to six
weeks is approximately one tenth of a year, so that one tenth of the total annual deposits
23
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A third source of income is from unclaimed deposits which
are usually five to ten percent of the total deposits collected.
Unclaimed deposits are kept by the distributor who also does
not have to pay a one and one half cent handling fee. The
amount of income generated annually in New York from un-
claimed deposits and fees could be $52 million.127
VI. Future Trends
With bottle bills in effect in nine states as of 1983, environ-
mentalists are pressing for a national bottle bill.' The rationale
for national legislation is that if state container laws solve litter,
solid waste, and energy problems at the state level, they will
solve those problems even more efficiently on a national scale.'"
New York's bottle bill, since it is in effect in the nation's second
most populous state in the country, will have a major influence
on efforts to pass a national bill. If the bill is effective, Congress
may be persuaded that success in New York signals the advent
of a national bill. 80
On the other hand, environmentalists fear that for this very
reason, the container industry will work to subvert an otherwise
successful recycling system. To substantiate these fears, they
point to industry sponsored amendments to the original legisla-
collected is investment income. That money can be invested in lucrative short term op-
tions and yield several million dollars before being returned to the retailer. Id. The four
million dollar figure for New York was based on a conservative investment rate of 10%.
127. See supra note 119. The figure is calculated by assuming that 10% of the con-
tainers will not be returned and multiplying by the total number of containers to get the
number of unreturned containers. Next, multiply the number of unreturned containers
by 6.5 cents, the combined deposit and handling fee, to get the savings to the distributor.
128. According to Sandy Nelson of Environmental Action Foundation, legislation
had been introduced in every Congressional session since 1971. Telephone interview,
supra note 18. The chief senate sponsors, Mark 0. Hatfield and Robert Packwood of
Oregon, have introduced senate bill S1247 in the current session. Congressman Jeffords
of Vermont has introduced a comparable bill, HR2960, in the House of Representatives.
129. See Hatfield & Owens, supra note 11, at 16. There are estimates of significant
conservation savings with a national law: 40% reduction in litter, up to a 6% reduction
in solid waste, reduced energy needs of 0.3%, a savings of 100 thousand barrels of oil per
day, and conservation of domestic supplies of bauxite and iron ore.
130. According to a lobbyist at Environmental Action, New York City in particular
is a crucial testing ground. "If a bottle bill works in New York City which has the most
difficult retail system in the country, is there any place that couldn't implement a bottle
bill?" Telephone interview, supra note 18.
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tion which have already increased the handling fee.13' Further-
more, they note that the study period has been shortened from
fifty-four months to sixteen months,182 which puts additional
pressure on the state to implement the law smoothly and
expeditiously.
With the effective implementation of container laws in Mas-
sachusetts"'3 and New York,'" and with new legislation in Cali-
fornia underway, 85 the pressure will continue in the 1980's for a
national bottle bill. If California passes a bottle bill, it is even
possible that industry lobbying will subside, once the public and
industry perceive the simplicity of one national system of
mandatory deposits, rather than a variety of inconsistent state
programs. New York should prove to be an important test mar-
ket for the feasibility of a uniform national bill, and for this rea-
son, many will await the results of the New York experience.*
Carolyn H. Fiske
131. See supra note 111 (industry lobbyists were successful in seeking amendment
to increase handling fees).
132. The original New York bill called for a commission to be convened in 1985 and
to report its findings by January 1, 1987. Returnable Container Act, ch. 200, sec. 3-10,
1982 N.Y. Laws 618-19. The 1983 amendments call for a commission to be named by
July 1, 1983, and to report by December 31, 1984. Returnable Beverage Containers (Bot-
tle Law), ch. 149, § 27-1014(3), 1983 N.Y. Laws 348.
133. The Massachusetts victory in the November, 1982 election is an important new
impetus to national legislation. According to the director of Massachusetts Public Inter-
est Research Group, a defeat would have signaled a weakness in the environmental
movement as a popular cause by being "devastating in its impact on citizen activism"
See IN THESE TIMEs, supra note 70.
134. According to the Executive Director of the New York Environmental Planning
Lobby, a group which was instrumental in the passage of New York's bottle bill, regula-
tion of beer and soft drink containers is just the first step. The organization will now
turn its attention to passing an Assembly bill which would require a 25 cent deposit on
all alcoholic beverage bottles other than malt liquor. The bill, if implemented, would
operate in much the same way as the state's Beverage Container Act. Such a law is not
likely to be passed for about three years, however, when it is thought that New Yorkers
will be comfortable with current container regulation. Telephone interview, supra note
24.
135. In California, environmental lobbyists are re-grouping to have a bottle bill on
the ballot in the November, 1986 elections if they have not persuaded the California
legislature to pass one before then.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Judith Enck, Executive Direc-
tor, Environmental Planning Lobby, Albany, N.Y. and Frank L. Parker, III, President,
Sound Distributing Co., Inc., Yonkers, N.Y.
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF BOTTLE BILLS IN NINE STATES
STATE
(in order of
implementation)
* %/-yes
AMOUNT HANDLING ADMINISTERING STATE NAME
OF DEPOSIT FEE AGENCY REQUIRED'
OREGON 5 cents minimum; Liquor
effective 2 cents for Control
1972 certified containers Commission
VERMONT greater ofVective 5 cents 2 cents Department ofeffective minimum or 20% Environmental
1973 of deposit Conservation
MICHIGAN 10 cents minimum;
effective 5 cents for Liquor Control
1978 certified containers Commission
MAINE 5Department
effective minimum 2 cents of
1978 Agriculture
IOWA Department of
effective 5 cents 1 cent Water, Air and
1979 minimum Waste
Management
Department of
CONNECTICUT 5 cents 1 cent Environmental
effective minimum
1980 Protection
DELAWARE Department of
effective 5 cents 20% of Natural Resources
1981 minimum deposit and EnvironmentalControl
5 cents minimum Department of
MASSACHUSETTS for less than 32 oz; I cent Environmental -
effective 10 cents minimum for Affairs
Jan. 1983 32 oz. or more
NEW YORK Department of
effective 5 cents 1.5 cents Environmental
Sept. 1983 minimum Conservation
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BANS
BANS PLASTIC
PULL-TOPS* LOOPS* PENALTIES SPECIAL FEATURES
suspension or
revocation of limits returnables to
V license; 96 per person per
maximum of $500 day
per day fine
maximum fine - educational program
of $1,00 for - bans sale of non-
each violation refillable glass
containers
fines of $100- not required to accept
$1,000 per each returnables for a
day of violation refund in excess of
plus costs of $25 per day
prosecution
maximum fine limits returnablesV / of $100 to 240 per person
per day
- deposit required on
alcoholic liquor bottlessimple - $100,000 paid annuallymisdemeanor for treatment of
alcoholics
1st offense: $50-1100 exempts containers
V 2nd offense: $100-$200 sold on interstate
3rd offense: $250-$500 passenger carriers
- .limits returnables
fine of $250-$1000, to 119 per person
injunction or T if - per week
VN/ijeltioo recurOree educational programlikelihood of recurrence, - persons under 20
monetary damages for cannot redeem beer or other
continuing violations alcoholic beverage
containers
exempts containers sold
maximum fine on interstate passenger
of $1,000 carriers
maximum fine of $500 requires temporary
V plus additional fine of state commission
$500 per each day violation to study effects
continues
1983]
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